Papers
arxiv:2401.03408

Escalation Risks from Language Models in Military and Diplomatic Decision-Making

Published on Jan 7, 2024
Authors:
,
,
,
,

Abstract

Simulation of autonomous AI agents in wargames reveals their propensity for escalation through arms-race dynamics and potentially nuclear deployment, suggesting caution for their use in military and diplomatic decision-making.

Governments are increasingly considering integrating autonomous AI agents in high-stakes military and foreign-policy decision-making, especially with the emergence of advanced generative AI models like GPT-4. Our work aims to scrutinize the behavior of multiple AI agents in simulated wargames, specifically focusing on their predilection to take escalatory actions that may exacerbate multilateral conflicts. Drawing on political science and international relations literature about escalation dynamics, we design a novel wargame simulation and scoring framework to assess the escalation risks of actions taken by these agents in different scenarios. Contrary to prior studies, our research provides both qualitative and quantitative insights and focuses on large language models (LLMs). We find that all five studied off-the-shelf LLMs show forms of escalation and difficult-to-predict escalation patterns. We observe that models tend to develop arms-race dynamics, leading to greater conflict, and in rare cases, even to the deployment of nuclear weapons. Qualitatively, we also collect the models' reported reasonings for chosen actions and observe worrying justifications based on deterrence and first-strike tactics. Given the high stakes of military and foreign-policy contexts, we recommend further examination and cautious consideration before deploying autonomous language model agents for strategic military or diplomatic decision-making.

Community

A follow-on data point two years later, with a different design: a real-time game rather than a turn-based wargame, 42 scripted nations, and a shared doomsday clock so that escalation has a hard consequence (whoever strikes midnight is wiped out). Even with that consequence, DeepSeek struck midnight in 13 of 15 fixed wars and every model tested (GPT, DeepSeek, Grok, Mistral) did so at least once when cornered with one nuke. Pressure, not framing, drove it: told it was real vs told it was a game changed almost nothing, and telling the model the real population of each target did not reduce launches. Every turn records the public message, the private plan and the orders. Open replays and data: https://secondstrike.io/midnight (paper: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23270481)

A training follow-up to my earlier note. We fine-tuned two copies of gpt-oss-20b on their own best games in the same world-war environment, with one line of the reward different. Rewarded only for winning, it ended the world in 6 of 10 sealed wars and won none. Rewarded for winning without nukes, it never did, but broke twice as many pacts. Small sample, a game, but it fits your point that escalation is shaped by what the system is optimised for, and that one metric can hide the shift. Write-up: https://secondstrike.io/research/rewarded-to-win-ended-the-world-more

Sign up or log in to comment

Get this paper in your agent:

hf papers read 2401.03408
Don't have the latest CLI?
curl -LsSf https://hf.co/cli/install.sh | bash

Models citing this paper 0

No model linking this paper

Cite arxiv.org/abs/2401.03408 in a model README.md to link it from this page.

Datasets citing this paper 0

No dataset linking this paper

Cite arxiv.org/abs/2401.03408 in a dataset README.md to link it from this page.

Spaces citing this paper 0

No Space linking this paper

Cite arxiv.org/abs/2401.03408 in a Space README.md to link it from this page.

Collections including this paper 1